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ABSTRACT
For roughly half a century, First Amendment doctrine has provided Americans with unusually expansive protection
for freedom of expression. In the wake of the divisive 2016 presidential election, this symposium contribution offers
some tentative reflections on whether and how the current judicial consensus supporting this doctrinal structure could
unravel—and why it may be particularly important in the current moment to prevent that from happening.
This Article pursues this inquiry, first, by highlighting the current understanding’s historical emergence against the
backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement. The Article then explores three salient recent developments that could
place increasing pressure on the current consensus view: (1) the problem of “fake news,” meaning deliberate
propagation of manifestly false news stories that shape public opinion; (2) the apparent disinhibition of bigoted
and hateful expression; and (3) the ongoing risk of both foreign and domestic terrorism and political violence more
generally. Although speech-repressive solutions to these problems may well gain increasing popular appeal, weakening First Amendment protection in any of these areas could open the door to highly selective and discriminatory
enforcement at different levels of government in our sharply divided polity. At the same time, because different
sides of our divided polity hold divergent perceptions of what speech is most dangerous, erosion along any of these
axes could increase pressure for reciprocal changes along the others.
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INTRODUCTION
For roughly half a century, First Amendment doctrine has provided
Americans with exceptionally broad protection for freedom of expression.
To a degree that is unusual around the world, even among other constitutional democracies, American constitutional law generally protects expression of even the most hateful, offensive, illiberal, and dangerous ideas.1 This
First Amendment absolutism, moreover, has been a striking point of judicial
consensus, even on our current, badly fractured Supreme Court. To be sure,
judges and justices have disagreed sharply on some important implications
of this principle, most notably the scope of constitutional protection for campaign finance2 and commercial advertising.3 Yet the core notion that “[t]he
First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea”4—and indeed
that this broad freedom of belief and expression is a structural imperative of
democratic self-government5—has been a principle that Justices Alito6 and
Ginsburg,7 or in an earlier day Justices Rehnquist8 and Brennan,9 could

1
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See infra Part I.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (holding that a ban on
independent election-related expenditures by for-profit corporations violated the First Amendment).
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that statutory restrictions on
the sale, disclosure, and use of records revealing the prescribing practices of doctors violated the
First Amendment).
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74–75 (1964))). See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 1097, 1098 (2016) (describing “broad consensus” among scholars and on the Supreme Court
that “the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic self-governance”).
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[ T ]he public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969))).
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.) (“It is uncontested and uncontestable
that government officials may not exclude from public places persons engaged in peaceful expressive activity solely because the government actor fears, dislikes, or disagrees with the views those
persons express.”).
Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“‘[ I ]f it is the speaker’s opinion that gives
offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas.’” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978))).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
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agree on. Just last year, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed it as
First Amendment “bedrock.”10
But in the longer term how stable is this consensus? Could it be
imperiled? In other areas of our public life, previously settled goodgovernance norms and constitutional understandings seem to be undergoing
steady erosion, as partisan animus drives us along a downward spiral of titfor-tat degradation. In the separation-of-powers context (the focus of my
own scholarship11), numerous important long-unresolved questions—
including questions about recess appointments, recognition power, treaty
confirmation, senatorial obligation to consider nominees, and faithful
execution—have lately come to the fore (and often required judicial
resolution) as each side’s clawing for position has stripped away buffers of
convention and self-restraint that previously spared us from reaching bare
questions of legality.12 With respect to the First Amendment, much the same
process may already be evident with respect to non-judicial protections for
free expression, as evidenced by such disparate phenomena as violent
disruption of controversial speakers on university campuses, apparent
declining popular support for free expression, and the current President’s
statements celebrating violence against protesters and journalistic critics.
Could this process extend as well to judicial doctrines? Although the
Constitution insulates federal courts from direct political pressure, for better
or worse judges have never been entirely immune to the intellectual climate
of their times; nor do they control the social conditions that generate cases
presented to them.13 This brief and modest symposium Article thus offers

10

11

12

13

because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (identifying as a “bedrock First Amendment
principle” that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”); id.
at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Aside from [certain] narrow exceptions [for categories of unprotected speech], it is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the government may not
punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.”).
See generally Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014)
(analyzing limits on executive enforcement discretion); Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357 (2018) (discussing Congress’s authority to control executive
powers through funding constraints); Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 937 (2017) (assessing whether due process principles protect reliance on federal nonenforcement policies).
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (interpreting Recess Appointments
Clause); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (addressing scope of President’s recognition power); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing scope
of executive immigration nonenforcement authority), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016); Jonathan H. Adler, The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to Consider Nominees, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 15 (2016) (addressing question whether Senate had duty to consider Supreme
Court nominee); Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 371 (2016) (addressing questions regarding absence of Senate confirmation for controversial recent international agreements).
The precise relationship between public opinion and judicial decision-making is a complex topic
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some tentative reflections on whether and how the expansive character of
existing First Amendment doctrine might come under increasing pressure—
and why it may be particularly important in the current moment to prevent
that from happening.
I pursue this inquiry here along two dimensions. First, to place current
developments in context, I highlight the historical circumstances under
which expansive protection for expressive freedom took hold in this country.
In my view, whether current doctrine is correct should ultimately turn on
consideration of first principles and objective legal analysis. Nevertheless,
the fact is that, as a matter of judicial enforcement, the First Amendment
largely lay dormant until the late 1930s and 1940s. What is more, it took on
its now-familiar absolutist cast only in the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement. I developed these thoughts for a symposium panel entitled “Free Speech as a Response to Hate Crimes.” In some
sense, our bedrock First Amendment doctrine was just that: we gained expansive First Amendment freedoms (and diverged from other western democracies in the breadth of this protection) in response to the atrocities of
Jim Crow.14 (As a useful if imprecise shorthand, I use the terms “absolutist,”
“absolute,” and “near-absolute” throughout this Article to describe the doctrinal structure, described in more detail in Part I below, that requires government neutrality with respect to even the most contemptible ideas, subject
only to narrow categorical exceptions.)
This history is worth emphasizing in its own right, yet past contingency
also highlights the possibility of future change, and recent political developments in both the United States and Europe should make clear that continued
governmental support for civil liberties is hardly inevitable.15 My second objective in this Article is thus to explore—tentatively and speculatively—several
recent developments in American society and culture that might place pressure on the current judicial consensus supporting broad expressive freedom.

14
15

addressed in a voluminous literature. For evidence of some connection between public opinion
and Supreme Court decisions, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1st ed. 2009) (“[O]ver time, as Americans have the opportunity to think
through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the American people.”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL E QUALITY 5 (2004) (“This book argues that
because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate, constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and political context of the times.”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown
and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005) (presenting evidence that “may
suggest that the Court’s legitimacy flows less from the soundness of its legal reasoning than from its
ability to predict future trends in public opinion”).
See infra Part II.
For a recent comparative study of pathways to constitutional retrogression, see generally Aziz Huq
& Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018).
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Although one could surely point to other changes as well, I highlight three
developments in American society that emerged out of the divisive 2016 national election: (1) the problem of “fake news,” by which I mean deliberate
propagation, particularly through social media, of demonstrably untrue factual assertions that nonetheless shape public opinion; (2) the apparent (or at
least perceived) disinhibition, particularly on the internet but also now in public demonstrations, of hateful and bigoted expression; and (3) the ongoing risk
of both foreign and domestic terrorism and political violence more generally.
I emphasize these three issues because all were particularly salient following the 2016 election (when the remarks on which this Article is based were
prepared), because all are hard problems with no easy solution, and because
all three may implicate existing pressure-points in the doctrine—areas where
case law permits plausible arguments for weaker protection, and indeed
where substantial arguments exist that more limited expressive freedom
could be consistent with some set of principled First Amendment protections.16 The risk I see in each of these areas is precisely that, whatever the
benefits of weakening protection, doing so could carry considerable costs.
Within our sharply divided polity, weakening protection in any of these areas—for false statements, offensive expression, or incitement of violence—
could open the door to highly selective and discriminatory enforcement, as
officials on one side or the other of our political divide cherry-pick statements
they find most objectionable for repression. In addition, precisely because
each side of our divided polity may hold quite different intuitions about what
speech is most dangerous or worthy of repression, erosion of protection along
any of these axes could produce reciprocal changes along the others.
I intend this exploration to be cautionary rather than predictive, and it is
not my purpose here to defend every feature of current First Amendment
doctrine. Perhaps we could tolerate minor adjustments in the core First
Amendment principles I address; though I am skeptical, perhaps some adjustments would even be merited. If we are going to travel down this path,
however, we should do so with our eyes open to the risks. The great virtue
of the current absolutist approach in First Amendment doctrine is precisely
the clarity of the rule it enforces. By tightly cabining the exceptions to First
Amendment protection, current doctrine squarely protects overheated rhetoric on all sides, thus leaving wide and unambiguous protection for the rest
of us. Given current high political passions, such protection strikes me as a
valuable heritage that we abandon at our peril.17

16
17

See infra Part III.
I address here only the expressive rights of United States citizens and speakers within the United
States. Whether equivalent protections apply to expression aimed at the United States by hostile
overseas actors is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
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My discussion proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I with a very brief
overview of existing First Amendment doctrine. I emphasize ways in which
current doctrine protects expression of even the most outrageous ideas, while
at the same time leaving the door open to government punishment when
hateful ideas manifest themselves in concrete criminal or discriminatory conduct. Part II then sketches the historical path that brought us to this point.
It highlights in particular the civil rights context in which this absolutist form
of protection took hold in the United States, even as it failed to do so in other
Western democracies. Part III then addresses the three developments noted
earlier that could weaken the consensus supporting this doctrine and open
pathways to reciprocal erosion of expressive protection. The Article ends
with a brief conclusion highlighting the value of the existing doctrine in our
unsettled current moment.
I. A CURSORY OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The “soul” of our First Amendment, as one leading First Amendment
lawyer recently put it, is its “anti-censorial” character—its radical insistence,
at least when expression relating to political ideas and social movements is at
stake, that “the dangers of permitting the government to decide what may
and may not be said, far more often than not, outweigh any benefits that may
result from suppressing or punishing offensive speech.”18 In doctrinal terms,
two basic principles embody this anti-censorial soul.
First, as a general rule, the First Amendment demands strict governmental neutrality between topics and ideas. Any governmental restriction based
on what is said—the speech’s “content,” meaning either viewpoint or subjectmatter—must generally satisfy “strict scrutiny,” which requires demonstrating that the law is narrowly drawn to achieving some compelling governmental purpose.19 Federal and state governments may impose some reasonable
“time, place, or manner” restrictions on expressive activities.20 They may, for
18

19
20

FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at xiv, xvii (2017). As Frederick Schauer
has observed, the First Amendment’s threshold boundaries—what verbal acts trigger First Amendment scrutiny to begin with—may be harder to characterize, although in general expression relating to public normative and political questions most clearly implicates the First Amendment. See
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766–67, 1801–02 (2004) (noting difficulty of determining “threshold applicability” and suggesting, based on prior work by Kent Greenawalt, that “the First Amendment plainly appears to be implicated . . . when the defendant’s speech is public rather than faceto-face, when it is inspired by the speaker’s desire for social change rather than for private gain,
when it relates to something general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative
rather than informational in content”).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 805 (2011).
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
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example, limit the size and placement of outdoor signs or the timing of protests in public streets and parks.21 But any such restriction must be contentneutral; it may not discriminate based on the message being expressed.22
What is more, permitting requirements for public protests may not give undue
discretion to those administering them, nor may they impose differential fees
on protesters based on the likely audience response to the message (and resulting need for police protection or other public services).23
At the same time, as a second countervailing principle, the Court has
identified certain categories of expression (often defined in part by their content) that are either unprotected or subject to lesser degrees of protection.24
Examples include obscene speech, fraudulent utterances, certain defamatory
statements, and “fighting words” (face-to-face personal insults). 25 The Court
has generally defined these exceptions narrowly,26 and in recent cases it has
seemed to call a halt to further recognition of more.27 Nevertheless, several
such categories are relevant here.
Most notably, “incitement,” meaning advocacy of illegal violence, may
be punished, but only within the confines of the narrow standard articulated
in Brandenburg v. Ohio:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.28

Similarly, threats of violence or illegal conduct may be punished, but the
Court has limited this category to “statements where the speaker means to

21
22
23
24

25

26
27

28

Id.; Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806–08 (1984).
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2529.
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130–31, 133–34 (1992).
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (listing examples and collecting
cases); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (plurality opinion) (listing examples and collecting cases).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69. Though “fighting words” are listed in Alvarez
as an unprotected category, other recent cases suggest that any remaining “fighting words” exception is exceedingly narrow. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (barring tort liability
for offensive protest even though “a few of the signs—such as ‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God
Hates You’—were viewed as containing messages related to [the plaintiffs] specifically”); see also
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting from vacatur
and remand in a case where the Court’s decision apparently rejected the view that “a verbal assault
on an unwilling audience may be so grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be the proper
subject of criminal proscription”).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69 (stressing the “limited” and “narrow[ ]” character of exceptions).
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790, 792–93 (2011) (declining to exempt
violent video games from First Amendment protection); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–70 (declining to
recognize exception for certain depictions of animal cruelty).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”29
Liability for some false or defamatory statements also remains possible,
but an elaborate body of cases stemming from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
blocks even private tort liability for many false statements about public officials or public figures (specifically, those propagated without “actual malice,”
meaning either knowledge of their falsity or reckless indifference to their
truth).30 As for false statements more generally, a recent plurality opinion
applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a restriction on certain non-defamatory
false statements,31 but a narrower concurring opinion appeared to leave the
government broader latitude to restrict some false statements under a more
open-ended balancing test.32 The Court has more clearly rejected any general exception to protection for offensive speech. In addition, although it
once upheld a prohibition on “group libel” (what we would today call “hate
speech”),33 more recent decisions have effectively repudiated this exception,
lumping racist invective into the general category of offensive expression that
remains protected unless it falls within some other unprotected category such
as incitement, threats, or fighting words.34
Modern First Amendment doctrine thus provides near-absolute protection for expression of ideas, no matter how hateful, offensive, indecent, or
illiberal. Bigots and radicals of all stripes fall under the First Amendment’s
banner, but by the same token so do flag-burners, anti-police activists, persecuted minorities, and others whom beleaguered, malicious, or intolerant
public officials might wish to repress.
The doctrine, moreover, balances its near-absolute protection for expression of ideas with near-absence of protection for concrete criminal or discriminatory actions. Accordingly, although abstract expression of bigoted
views is protected, the government is free to impose enhanced sentences on
29

30

31
32
33
34

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708
(1969) (per curiam) (rejecting prosecution for the “political hyperbole” of a draft protester’s statement that “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.”);
cf. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (interpreting a federal threat statute to
require threatening intent and thus avoiding First Amendment issues).
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring proof of “actual malice”
in defamation suits brought by public officials); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
342 (1974) (extending the actual malice standard to public figures in general).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 730–32 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952) (allowing criminal liability for “wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups”).
See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (plurality opinion) (striking down a statutory
provision that prohibited registering disparaging trademarks); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (invalidating a city ordinance that specifically punished “bias-motivated”
fighting words (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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bias-motivated crimes,35 to proscribe various forms of discrimination in employment and commercial dealings,36 and to punish criminal conspiracies
motivated by political beliefs.37 It may even use protected expression as evidence to establish particular proscribed motivations.38 Although some have
questioned this distinction’s coherence,39 modern free expression case law
thus seeks to balance two central imperatives of democratic self-government—guaranteeing personal and public security, on the one hand, and protecting freedom of opinion, on the other—by drawing a sharp line between
expression and action, word and deed.
II. CONTINGENT ORIGINS
How did we get to this place? According to one recent comparative survey,
both sides of the American doctrine regarding intolerant speech—the degree of
protection for expression and the degree of proscription for bias-motivated
conduct—appear distinctive among other advanced democracies.40 Simply
put, other western democracies may often allow broader punishment for hate
speech and incitement of violence, but may also impose less vigorous restrictions
on bias-motivated conduct.41 This anomalousness notwithstanding, whether

35
36

37

38
39

40

41

See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993) (upholding enhanced penalties for biasmotivated criminal acts).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t
Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “implicitly acknowledged” that the First Amendment provides no defense to workplace harassment claims).
See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 127 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a terrorism conspiracy conviction “where the appellants engaged in extensive conversations . . . about the necessity of waging violent jihad and their shared goal of reaching the jihadist
battlefield”).
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489 (indicating that a defendant’s speech can be used as evidence of a biased
motive).
See, e.g., ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO BE RACIST?: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM 109 (2011) (“Legal theorists and Supreme Court Justices have struggled with how to distinguish speech from conduct.”); cf. FREDERICK
M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN L AW 89–102 (1999) (discussing “[t]he slipperiness of the speech-conduct distinction”). For a defense of the speech-conduct
distinction, see, for example, FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 4–9 (John K. Wilson ed. 1993) (“[I]t is necessary to distinguish speech from action if
the First Amendment is to have any meaning other than the senseless proposition that the government shall make no laws.”).
BLEICH, supra note 39, at 11 (characterizing the United States as “the major exception to the postwar trend toward limiting freedom in favor of penalizing racism”); id. at 107–08 (indicating that
“the United States was a leader in making racial discrimination and hate crimes illegal” and that
although European governments have “followed in the United States’ footsteps,” these governments have “seldom” acted “with similar vigor” in “establishing laws against racial discrimination
and hate crimes”).
Id. at 108; see also ABRAMS, supra note 18, at xv–xvii (comparing the types of speech that are protected
by the First Amendment in the United States with those protected in other democratic nations).
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American First Amendment doctrine is correct ultimately turns on questions of
interpretive theory regarding our own distinctive constitutional text and
tradition—questions far beyond the scope of this modest Article. Assuming for
present purposes that our basic doctrine is sound—or at least (as nearly every
mainstream interpretive theory now recognizes) that overturning entrenched
decisions should require an exceptionally powerful justification42—it
nonetheless provides helpful context for current questions to appreciate the
historical circumstances in which key building blocks of modern First
Amendment doctrine were lain.
Summarizing greatly, although the First Amendment of course was included in the original Bill of Rights of 1791 and has featured in political and
judicial debates over expressive freedom ever since, the robust judicial protection for free expression that we now enjoy first took hold in the 1930s and
1940s, during the formative period for modern constitutional law following
the New Deal.43 To be sure, progressive reaction to the federal government’s
repression of subversive speech during World War I provided one important
impetus for greater civil-liberties consciousness during the inter-war period.44
Nevertheless, and despite recognizing in principle that speech posing no
“clear and present danger” was constitutionally protected, the Supreme
Court’s classic First Amendment decisions from the first decades of the twentieth century were remarkably tolerant of government repression.45 As Laura

42

43

44
45

For some recent discussion of the appropriate force of precedent, see generally RANDY J. KOZEL,
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017) (offering a general theory of stare
decisis). See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358–61 (2015)
(addressing the force of precedent within originalist interpretive theory).
The historical account offered in this paragraph draws heavily from LAURA WEINRIB, THE
TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016) [hereinafter
WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH]. For some other classic historical accounts, see, for
example, ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (1st ed. 2004). On
the connection between First Amendment freedom and other central features of post-New Deal
constitutional law, see Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297,
321 (2014) (noting that “[s]trong judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights is properly regarded as
a keystone of the New Deal settlement,” with other key elements being “a relaxation of structural
constraints on Congress’s control over the economy” and “an invigoration of constitutional protections for ‘discrete and insular minorities’ along with free speech” (footnote omitted) (citing LARRY
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 122 (2004))). Capturing the basic logic of this constitutional understanding, Weinrib observes: “judicial deference to the outcome of democratic processes requires robust debate, with
ample protection for minority interests, as state policy is formulated and implemented.” Id. at 321–
22 (citing MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 158–59 (1991)).
WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 43, at 4–5.
STONE, supra note 43, at 192–211 (discussing key post-World War I Supreme Court cases that
interpreted the First Amendment).
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Weinrib has recently shown, more robust, counter-majoritarian judicial protection took hold only later, against the backdrop of fascism’s rise around the
world, as key elements of the American labor movement shed their Lochnerera hostility towards courts and sought constitutional protection for rights of
protest.46 An intellectual consensus supporting judicial enforcement of the
First Amendment thus “grew out of a state-skeptical brand of labor radicalism, grafted onto a conservative legal tradition of individual rights.”47
Even with this groundwork in place, however, Supreme Court decisions
from the 1930s to 1950s were decidedly mixed regarding the extent of First
Amendment protection for potentially violent illiberal groups.48 In Beauharnais
v. Illinois in 1952, for example, the Court upheld a state law forbidding what
we would now call “hate speech.”49 (Using terminology from David Riesman’s
scholarship on fascist subversion of European democracies, the Court at the
time called it “group libel” and lumped it together with individualized libel as
a form of unprotected expression.50) With memories of fascist and communist
revolutions in Europe fresh in their minds, some of the Court’s leading liberals,
particularly Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, worried openly about the degree
to which our Constitution should protect advocacy by groups bent on
destroying it.51

46
47

48

49
50

51

WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 43, at 11.
Id. at 5; see also Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech & Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 96 (2000) (tracing the “emergence of the modern, libertarian conception of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” to post-war “changes in
political culture” including economic growth, heightened fears of totalitarianism, and worries about
“bureaucratic ineptitude”).
See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 146 (2006) (describing free speech doctrine between 1917 and
1957, particularly with respect to subversive activities, as oscillating between liberal and “speechrepressive” impulses).
343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952).
Id. at 259 n.9 (citing David Riesman, Democracy & Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 727 (1942)); see also David Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUB. POL’Y 33, 53–
54 (1942) (discussing questions presented by allowing Nazis and Communists to freely advocate
restricting the rights of other groups).
See, e.g., Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258–59 (Frankfurter, J.) (“Illinois did not have to look beyond her
own borders or await the tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that wilful [sic]
purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully
to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.” (footnote omitted) (citing Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democarcies, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 1085 (1938))); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 422 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing “the decisive differences between the Communist Party and every other party of any importance in the long experience of the United States with party government”); Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 23
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (characterizing a rally as “a local manifestation of a world-wide and
standing conflict between two organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has imported to this country the strong-arm technique developed in the struggle by which their kind has
devastated Europe”).
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First Amendment doctrine took on its now-familiar absolutist cast only in
the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement.52
Many foundational First Amendment decisions, including New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,53 Street v. New York,54 Wood v. Georgia,55 and NAACP v. Button,56 were
in fact civil rights decisions. In Sullivan, for example, the Court interpreted
the First Amendment to protect an open “interchange of ideas” by limiting
defamation liability for criticism of public officials.57 But the decision’s immediate effect was to shut down abusive litigation against civil rights leaders and
northern newspapers by Jim Crow authorities.58 Likewise, in Street, the Court
called it “firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive
to some of their hearers,” yet it did so in a case where this principle supported
invalidating a civil rights protester’s conviction for flag-burning.59 Even Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the 1972 decision establishing the rule of strict
scrutiny for content-based limitations on expression, not only was itself a civil
rights decision (the speaker in question was protesting racial discrimination),
but also imported its framework for analyzing speech restrictions from earlier
cases applying strict scrutiny to race-based legal classifications.60
In his comparative study, Erik Bleich notes that the United States diverged
from major European democracies with respect to its protection of hate speech
during precisely this period.61 Bleich points to contemporary civil rights and
52

53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60

61

For a discussion of interconnections between free speech and anti-discrimination case law, see
MARK J. RICHARDS, THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 58–82 (2013). See also, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1996) (“During the 1950s
and 1960s, free speech became intertwined in popular and legal consciousness with another substantive cause that was beginning to prosper—that of the civil rights movement.”).
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (addressing a libel suit against civil rights activists).
394 U.S. 576, 578, 594 (1969) (invalidating the appellant’s conviction for burning the flag in a civil
rights protest).
370 U.S. 375, 379, 395 (1962) (invalidating a contempt-of-court conviction based on criticism of a
grand-jury investigation that targeted African-American voters and activists).
371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963) (protecting the associational rights of a civil rights advocacy group).
376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
For background on this litigation campaign against the civil rights movement, see Christopher W.
Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV.
293, 295–96 (2014) [hereinafter Schmidt, Sullivan and the Legal Attack] (describing the impact of the
segregationist countermovement on civil rights activity and the Supreme Court); see also Christopher
W. Schmidt, Litigating Against the Civil Rights Movement, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (2015) (discussing legal defenses of Jim Crow more generally).
Street, 394 U.S. at 592.
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”). For a discussion of the case’s background and its connection to
racial equality concerns, see RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 1–5, 48–57.
BLEICH, supra note 39, at 74 (noting that, in the 1960s and 1970s, while “most European countries . . . were restricting speech that evoked the Nazi era or that tried to aggravate societal divisions
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antiwar dissident movements as a possible explanation.62 “During this volatile
era” in the United States, Bleich observes, “protecting [minorities’ and dissidents’] right to protest trumped any interest in restricting racist speech.”63
Whatever the precise causal relationship between this historical context
and the Court’s decision-making, the key point here is that the Court’s formative decisions guaranteeing a robust governmental neutrality between ideas
must be understood against this civil rights backdrop.64 In Brandenburg, for example, the Court’s narrow standard for incitement served to protect white supremacists’ violent rhetoric from government sanction,65 yet the Justices surely
understood that in other cases dissidents and minorities of other sorts would
benefit from its decision. After all, as Michael Klarman rather cynically observes, the Court “supplied its most robust interpretations of the First Amendment” only after “the complete collapse of the internal [Communist] subversion threat in the 1960s” and substantial weakening of the Ku Klux Klan.66
In the ensuing decades, as we have seen, the Supreme Court has by and
large only built out still broader protections from this foundation. Applying
the rule of strict scrutiny for content-based limitations, courts have laid waste
to everything from pornography restrictions67 and campaign finance limitations68 to municipal signage ordinances69 and data privacy protections.70
Categories of unprotected speech have shrunk down or disappeared,71 while
the category of “speech” subject to First Amendment protection in the first
place has steadily expanded.72 To some minds, this case law has slipped its

62
63
64

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

between groups,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s “decision[s] in those decades permitted aggressive,
vituperative, or hateful speech, even when aimed at racial, ethnic, and religious groups”).
Id. at 75 (“The civil rights and antiwar movements . . . converged in the 1960s around the principle
of free speech.” (footnote omitted)).
Id.
See, e.g., Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(on file with author) (noting the Supreme Court’s suspicion of southern juries as a motivating consideration in developing modern speech-protective judicial doctrines); Schmidt, Sullivan and the Legal Attack, supra note 58, at 313 (“[W]hen the legal attacks on the Civil Rights Movement made their
way to the Supreme Court, the Justices were predisposed to come to the aid of those who were
struggling to advance the cause of civil rights.”).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating the conviction of a
Ku Klux Klan member under a “Criminal Syndicalism” statute).
Klarman, supra note 52, at 36.
See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986) (invalidating an anti-pornography ordinance).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (invalidating restrictions on electionrelated expenditures by corporations).
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (invalidating a town signage law).
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (invalidating a medical privacy law
because the First Amendment protects “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing”).
See supra Part I.
See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1614–16 (2015) (describing the expansion of speech categories subject to First Amendment protection).
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moorings in some applications.73 Some also worry that the very expansion
risks diluting the First Amendment’s meaning where it most matters.74 Rather than rehearse these concerns about the doctrine’s outermost projections,
however, I will turn here to some speculative concerns about more novel
threats to the bedrock itself.
III. A CONTINGENT FUTURE?
Highlighting the historical circumstances in which First Amendment absolutism took hold raises the question whether contemporary circumstances
remain as conducive to maintaining these civil libertarian commitments. For
the moment, the core principle of neutrality between ideas seems stable; the
Supreme Court just collectively reaffirmed it.75 Furthermore, because the
First Amendment is so robustly judicially enforced, the existing judicial consensus regarding its meaning should provide substantial protection for expressive freedom even if political support weakens. Free expression is an area
where judicial review’s counter-majoritarian power is real and important.
Nevertheless, in the longer term, changes in the intellectual climate, the
character of cases that come before the Court, or the social and technological
contexts in which disputes arise could push First Amendment doctrine in less
absolutist directions. A major feature of our social and political context,
moreover, is increasing partisan polarization and distrust. This context could
(and should, in my view) push each side to recognize the value of mutual
toleration of opposing viewpoints, yet it may also drive each side towards
increasingly intolerant and repressive attitudes.76
We may already be seeing a sort of downward spiral with respect to First
Amendment freedoms protected by norms and conventions rather than judicial doctrine. Among other examples, apparent declining expectations of
public disclosure and press questioning for presidents and presidential candidates, disruption of controversial speakers on college campuses, threats to
73

74

75

76

See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915,
1917–18 (2016) (criticizing emerging First Amendment challenges to economic regulations); Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399–1400 (2017) (arguing that an emerging “libertarian” free speech
jurisprudence gives undue protection to corporate expression).
Schauer, supra note 72, at 1635 (“When the coverage of the First Amendment expands . . . there is
an increased possibility that, out of necessity, some of the existing doctrinal tools developed for a
smaller area of coverage will have to be modified, possibly with unfortunate consequences.”).
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (plurality opinion) (invalidating registration restrictions for trademarks considered disparaging); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (supporting
the same result).
For an account of increasing partisan polarization generally, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T.
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY & UNEQUAL
RICHES (2d ed. 2016).
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private communication from surveillance and data collection,77 and President Trump’s illiberal campaign rhetoric may all suggest declining commitment to the First Amendment outside of courts. In this modest Article,
though, I will just highlight three areas where a process of reciprocal degradation could conceivably take hold within judicial doctrine itself, even if that
possibility still appears unlikely. As noted earlier, I have selected the three
areas I address here—fake news, hate speech, and terrorism—because they
fall along arguable pressure points in the case law, places where at least incremental adjustments in the degree of First Amendment protection seem
possible, and maybe even desirable in the abstract. I have also picked them
because they are hard problems. Threats from propagandistic manipulation,
hateful advocacy, and terrorist violence are real; they may well be getting
worse; and the burdens they impose are not necessarily distributed evenly
across our society. How to address them thoughtfully in a manner consistent
with our constitutional traditions and the requirements of personal security
and public order are issues that require much greater thought and attention—an enterprise to which this symposium contributed.
The only theme I want to explore here is how addressing these problems
as a matter of First Amendment doctrine could intersect in unfortunate ways
with our current polarized political environment. Whatever their faults, the
great virtue of current narrow definitions of applicable First Amendment exceptions is the clarity of the rule they enforce. By protecting overheated and
exaggerated rhetoric on all sides, current doctrine cuts off risks of discriminatory enforcement that otherwise could be quite pronounced amid current partisan dynamics. It also may prevent a certain downward spiral, in which weakening the rule of broad expressive freedom along any one dimension produces
greater pressure to weaken it along others. Though these concerns are admittedly quite speculative and uncertain, I will elaborate them briefly here by addressing each problem in turn and then reflecting on the broader dynamics.
A. Enlightenment Protections Without Enlightenment Minds
A first possible threat to the current First Amendment absolutism is the
recent apparent success of manifest falsehoods—“fake news”—in manipulating voters’ beliefs during the 2016 campaign. This new and troubling development, which is largely a function of new internet technologies and social
media, presents both a long-term intellectual risk and a more immediate
practical concern regarding expressive freedom.78

77
78

On this concern, see generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of
Big Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279 (2015).
For an overview of social media technology’s role in the 2016 presidential campaign, see Nathaniel
Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 64–69 (2017).
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To start with the intellectual risk, continued success of internet propaganda
in shaping beliefs could easily induce widespread corrosive cynicism about the
value of free expression. One classic justification for free speech has always
been a notion that open debate will enable truth and justice to prevail. Though
recognizing that truth will not necessarily gain immediate acceptance, John
Stuart Mill famously argued in On Liberty that “collision with error” may produce a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth” and that
when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times,
but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover
it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.79

Two centuries earlier, the poet John Milton put the point still more emphatically. “Let [Truth] and Falshood grapple,” Milton argued in a classic defense of free expression; “who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and
open encounter?”80
These assertions, which the Supreme Court invoked in a key free speech
decision,81 reflect a certain Enlightenment optimism that underlies important
features of our institutions, the First Amendment included. If people are only
given freedom to make their own choices, determine their own beliefs, and
govern themselves, then over time government policy will converge around
desirable outcomes rooted in sound empirical judgments.82
But it turns out we have Enlightenment institutions without Enlightenment
minds. Open debate may well be a necessary precondition for truth’s emergence, but it is hardly sufficient; human beings’ views are often governed by
considerations of interest, emotion, and cognitive bias rather than objective rationality. We now have the benefit of whole literatures demonstrating this
point. Even apart from longstanding romantic, theological, and materialist critiques of human rationality, psychological and behavioral economics research
has demonstrated our minds’ fallibility in rich detail,83 while political scientists

79
80
81
82

83

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33, 54 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859).
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (1644).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
Cf. MILL, supra note 79 (“As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be
measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested.”). But see HAIMAN, supra note 39, at 7 (arguing, with reference to Mill, that “a free and
unfettered marketplace of ideas is the best way to conduct a search for truth—not because truth
will always prevail over falsehood . . . but because there is ordinarily a better chance of approximating truth when ideas are challenged by competing ideas than when they are dogmatically asserted and accepted”).
For general accounts of this body of research, see, for example, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW (2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007); RICHARD H. THALER,
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2015).
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have shown how emotional attachments and group identities frequently override rational policy assessment in determining voting behavior.84
Partisan polarization, moreover, appears to make these problems considerably worse. As a result of so-called “confirmation bias”—peoples’ tendency to attend to assertions that confirm existing beliefs and discredit those
that do not—voters’ perception of even basic facts often gets filtered through
the distorting lenses of partisan attachment and suspicion of the other side’s
good faith.85 At the same time, new technologies such as the internet, social
media, and cable news today enable citizens to inhabit information worlds
shaped predominantly by their partisan preconceptions. In the internet context, moreover, deceptive or manipulative communications may be targeted
specifically at narrow groups considered likely to be receptive, and the communications may not even be visible to outsiders (and thus subject to rebuttal)
unless they are shared beyond the targeted circle of like-minded individuals.86
The 2016 election cycle offered vivid evidence of these problems. The
build-up to the election witnessed an extraordinary profusion of fake news
reports, particularly on social media.87 Many demonstrably untrue stories,
some apparently manufactured and distributed by hostile actors overseas,
took on a life of their own as social media sharing and computerized newsfeeds diffused such stories uncritically through networks of like-minded individuals.88 What precise impact such “fake news” stories had is unclear; some

84

85
86

87
88

See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 232–38 (2016) (canvassing literature
on this point).
See id. at 267–84, 294–96.
See, e.g., Philip Bump, The Investigation Goes Digital: Did Someone Point Russia to Specific Online Targets?,
WASH. POST (July 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/12/
the-investigation-goes-digital-did-someone-point-russia-to-specific-online-targets/?utm_term=.7c50
3b345469 (discussing targeted advertisements used by the Trump presidential campaign in 2016).
For general discussion of these developments, see Persily, supra note 78, at 67–71.
Id. at 68; see also, e.g., Amit Chowdhry, Facebook Launches a New Tool that Combats Fake News, FORBES
(Mar. 5, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2017/03/05/facebookfake-news-tool/#5e5bcb1e7ec1 (describing measures adopted by Facebook and Google to address
the spread of false news stories during the 2016 election); Olivia Solon, Facebook Staff Mount Secret
Push to Tackle Fake News, Reports Say, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016, 8:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/14/facebook-fake-news-us-election-news-feed-algorithm (describing Facebook’s use of an “an algorithm that subsequently trended several fake stories”); Olivia Solon, In Firing Human Editors, Facebook Has Lost the Fight Against Fake News, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016,
4:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/29/facebook-trending-news-editors-fake-news-stories (discussing Facebook’s firing of human news editors in 2016 and suggesting
that because “Facebook’s algorithm . . . decides which content people see in their news feeds, it is
arguably irresponsible for the company to allow misinformation to spread unfettered when it is now
so influential in the daily distribution of news”); Laura Sydell, We Tracked Down a Fake-News Creator
in the Suburbs. Here’s What We Learned, NPR (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/11/23/503146770/npr-finds-the-head-of-a-covert-fake-news-operation-in-the-suburbs (describing the production and spread of false news stories).
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analysis suggests it was limited.89 Yet the problem may get worse. New technology already enables production of manufactured conversations with real
peoples’ voices, and such fake recordings will likely soon be indistinguishable
from the real thing.90 Soon the answer to the Marx Brothers’ famous question, “who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?,” may no longer
be obvious.91 Objective validation of information may be more important
than ever, yet at the same time public trust in traditional mediating institutions like newspapers that could vet and verify claims is declining.92
What is more, false claims in the 2016 cycle proved remarkably impervious to debunking. The most salient falsehood suffices to illustrate this point.
Donald Trump, who of course ultimately won the presidency, rose to political prominence by ostentatiously associating himself with the “birther”
movement that questioned whether President Barack Obama was born in
the United States.93 He was (and even if he wasn’t, his right to citizenship
from birth by virtue of his mother’s citizenship would have made him a “natural born citizen” eligible for the presidency).94 But it didn’t matter. To this
day, and even though Trump ultimately disclaimed the birther myth when
it became politically inconvenient, polls suggest that more than a quarter of
Americans believe Obama was definitely or probably born outside the
United States.95 A political environment in which this outcome is possible is
not one in which we can be confident that truth will come out ahead “in a
free and open encounter.”96
In my view, the human fallibility demonstrated by such examples does
nothing to undermine the Supreme Court’s broad construction of First

89

90

91
92
93

94

95
96

See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 211, 232 (2017) (questioning whether fake news had a meaningful impact on the
2016 election). For some critical commentary on this study, see Persily, supra note 78, at 69–70.
See Natasha Lomas, Lyrebird Is a Voice Mimic for the Fake News Era, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/25/lyrebird-is-a-voice-mimic-for-the-fake-news-era/ (indicating that computerized voice mimicking that is “indistinguishable from the real thing” will be possible “in a matter of years” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexandre de Brébisson)).
DUCK SOUP (Paramount Productions 1933).
Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx.
For one account of this sorry episode in the midst of the campaign, see David A. Graham, An
Unrepentant Trump Finally Acknowledges Obama as American, ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-birther/500327 (describing how
“Trump spent five years fanning the racist conspiracy theory” that Obama was not born in the
United States).
Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen,” 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
161, 161 (2015) (indicating the phrase “natural born citizen” means “someone who was a U.S.
citizen at birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time”).
THE ECONOMIST/YOU GOV POLL, 2016, at 58 tbl. 50 (2016), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/ljv2ohxmzj/econTabReport.pdf.
MILTON, supra note 80, at 35.
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Amendment freedoms. On the contrary, it shows only that the truth-will-prevail theory, though invoked in some key First Amendment decisions,97 was
never adequate to justify the doctrine’s basic features. Broad expressive freedom is better understood as a vital underpinning of popular sovereignty. If the
government must answer to the people, and not vice versa, then the people
must remain free to formulate views, however misguided, that challenge government orthodoxy. Indeed, some have argued that deep suspicion of government—a fear that government officials themselves may misjudge public interests and seek to distort public opinion—provides the most cogent rationale for
the reigning free speech absolutism.98 From that point of view, human vulnerability to deception and propaganda may only make it more imperative to keep
the channels of communication open to competing viewpoints. The best statements of free speech absolutism have always recognized as much.99
Nevertheless, popular acceptance of the Supreme Court’s free speech absolutism could yield to corrosive cynicism if the problem of fake news and
deliberate falsehood grows worse. Simply put, if significant elements of the
electorate—on whichever side—perceive truth as consistently losing in open
debate, expressive freedom may lose some of its luster, and people might then
develop less tolerant attitudes towards expression of views they perceive as
untrue. Polarization, moreover, may compound this problem: Americans’

97

98

99

See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (“[I]t is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969))).
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1989)
(“Not only the first amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of freedom of speech, is an
embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers.”); cf. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective
and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985) (arguing that “in adjudicating first
amendment disputes and fashioning first amendment doctrines, courts ought to adopt what might
be termed the pathological perspective,” meaning that “the overriding objective at all times should
be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance
of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle
dissent systematically”); Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (advocating constitutional protection for some false
statements based on an understanding that “the First Amendment is not, in the end, primarily
about protecting the individual’s right to speak; rather, the First Amendment is primarily about
constraining the collective authority of temporary political majorities to exercise their power by
determining for everyone what is true and false, as well as what is right and wrong”).
The classic statement of this view, expressed with trademark fatalism, is from Justice Holmes’s dissent in Gitlow v. New York:
Every idea is an incitement. . . . Eloquence may set fire to reason. But . . . [i]f in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way.
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a necessary condition of freedom of speech.”), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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increasing tribalism and resulting imperviousness to persuasion may discourage efforts at reasoned persuasion in the first place. Such intolerance, in
time, could then legitimate efforts to more actively manage public opinion in
the name of truth, thus eroding consensus support for the Supreme Court’s
robust neutrality between good and bad ideas.
A more hopeful alternative, of course, is that the public will gradually
inoculate itself against online manipulation, much as it eventually did with
respect to earlier forms of propaganda. As we adjust to a new world in which
truth is less apparent on the face of things, new antibodies may develop in
the body politic. The public may grow more skeptical, and thus less gullible;
new intermediaries and objective measures of validity may emerge as well.
In the meantime, though, proposals to regulate political falsehoods might
well gain greater traction, and perhaps even a sympathetic audience among
some judges. Some new regulations in the internet context might even be
prudent. Given their effective functioning as public forums rather than
private advocates, some evenhanded regulation of social media platforms
might be consistent with First Amendment principles. Likewise, some form
of disclosure requirement for micro-targeted advertising, so as to facilitate its
exposure and rebuttal, might be justifiable, and so might some general
restrictions on particular deceptive techniques, such as use of the new voicesimulation technology to manufacture fake recordings, or swapping of photos
from other contexts into fake stories about current events. Finally, speech by
hostile overseas actors need not necessarily receive the same protection
afforded to citizens and domestic speakers.
Yet going beyond such measures and restricting political falsehoods more
generally, though an option current case law does not entirely rule out,100
might well open the door to selective repression of the false assertions those in
power at any given time perceive to be most damaging.101 To be blunt about
100

101

Compare United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Were the Court to
hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any
evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.”), with id. at
732 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as here,
the regulations concern false statements about easily verifiable facts that do not concern such subject
matter. Such false factual statements are less likely than are true factual statements to make a
valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”), and Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)
(“Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
Cf. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“The mere potential for the exercise of [censorial
power over false statements] casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech,
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”); BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (noting that “while false statements may be unprotected for their own
sake, ‘[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
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it, a free-floating power to restrict political assertions because they are false may
well be attractive to those dismayed by a gullible electorate, but it is not a power
we can entrust to a government we now know may be led by a President willing
to selectively disparage even honest and legitimate criticism as “fake news.”
B. Hate’s New Disinhibition
A second threat to expressive freedom emerging out of the recent election
involves the apparent ongoing “disinhibition” of hateful expression.102 Whatever his own views on race and religion, unabashedly bigoted, anti-Semitic,
and anti-Islamic “alt-right” and “white nationalist” groups embraced President Trump as their own.103 One consequence was reemergence into public
debate of openly racist views, not only online in various forms, but also in public demonstrations.104 Meanwhile, high-profile acts of hate-motivated vandalism and violence following the election have stoked fears that this rising invective may have tangible consequences.105 Combining the two trends, a recent
white nationalist demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia led to a terroristic
attack on counter-protesters that killed one individual and injured others.106
Racism, anti-Semitism, and the like are obviously not new to the United
States, and much as with fake news, the real impact of these developments
remains unclear. Some have suggested it is better to have hateful views out

102
103

104

105

106

814 F.3d 466, 474–76 (6th Cir. 2016) (invalidating under strict scrutiny a state law restricting certain
election-related false statements); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014)
(same). For an argument that some narrow restrictions on false election-related speech may remain
permissible under Alvarez, see Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?,
74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 56–57 (2013).
The source of this phrase appears to be John Marshall, The Great Disinhibition, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Nov. 18, 2016, 10:57 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/the-great-disinhibition.
See, e.g., Graeme Wood, His Kampf, ATLANTIC, June 2017, at 40, 43, 51 (discussing “alt-right” leader
Richard Spencer’s support for Trump’s candidacy); Sarah Posner & David Neiwert, How Trump
Took Hate Groups Mainstream, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/donald-trump-hate-groups-neo-nazi-white-supremacist-racism
(noting online approval of Trump by neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, and white nationalist
websites).
See, e.g., White Supremacy: Are US Right-Wing Groups on the Rise?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40915356 (assessing the strength of far-right groups
and discussing their online activity and public rally in Charlottesville, Virginia).
See, e.g., G. Reginald Daniel & Jasmine Kelekay, From Loving v. Virginia to Barack Obama: The Symbolic Tie that Binds, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 663–65 (2017) (listing “bomb threats to Jewish
community centers and synagogues across the nation,” the burning of mosques, and requests “for
the genocide of liberals and deportation of Jewish people” as results of Trump’s political ascent).
Joe Heim, Ellie Silverman, T. Rees Shapiro & Emma Brown, One Dead as Car Strikes Crowds Amid
Protests of White Nationalist Gathering in Charlottesville; Two Police Die in Helicopter Crash, WASH. POST
(Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/fights-in-advance-of-saturday-protestin-charlottesville/2017/08/12/155fb636-7f13-11e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?utm_term=.
7df3bc9a2f83.
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in the open than swept under the rug.107 Furthermore, important efforts are
being made to return hate groups to the fringes where they belong.108 Only
time will tell whether we are witnessing a real retrogression in public attitudes
or only an atavistic spasm that will recede as quickly as it arose.
Again as with fake news, though, perceptions may be at least as important
as realities. Simply put, if people feel menaced by hate groups, they will be less
willing to brush off expression of threatening ideas. Already, serious arguments
exist for withdrawing First Amendment protection from some narrow category
of hate speech, as indeed is done in other western democracies and once
appeared to be the law in the United States.109 Such arguments may well gain
momentum if the problem of hateful expression grows more salient and direct
prohibitions on hate-motivated violence or discrimination are perceived as
ineffective means of combatting it. At the same time, continued political
success of figures lauded by bigoted groups could heighten calls for countermajoritarian constitutional protection against their hateful advocacy.
More immediately, at any rate, hard cases might well generate pressure
for incremental expansion of existing standards for unprotected threats and
incitement. Although the Supreme Court has narrowly defined the standard
for “true threats,” the standard’s application badly divided the Supreme
Court in its last major threats case.110 Some lower court opinions, moreover,
have controversially applied the standard to allow suppression of violent
online advocacy.111 For its part, the Brandenburg incitement test, though designed to tightly constrain the domain of unprotected subversive advocacy,
107
108

109
110

111

See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 43, at 162 (“One of the arguments for allowing hateful speech is that it
makes the rest of us aware of terrible beliefs and strengthens our resolve to combat them.”).
See, e.g., Arnel Hecimovic, Anti-Racist Rallies Across the United States—In Pictures, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/gallery/2017/aug/14/anti-racist-rallies-acrossthe-united-states-in-pictures (reporting rallies responding to the white supremacist demonstration
in Charlottesville).
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 3–6 (2012) (arguing against the protection of hate speech).
In Virginia v. Black, one majority on the Court held that a burning cross could constitute an unprotected “true threat,” while a different majority nonetheless invalidated a statutory provision treating
cross burnings as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. See 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Respondents do not contest that some cross burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech,
and rightly so.”); id. at 365 (plurality opinion) (holding that the prima facie provision “would create
an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas” because “[t]he act of burning a cross may mean
that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation” or “only that the person is
engaged in core political speech” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at 386
(Souter, J., concurring) (“To the extent the prima facie evidence provision skews prosecutions, then,
it skews the statute toward suppressing ideas.”). More recently, in Elonis v. United States, the Court
reversed a conviction under a federal threats statute where the speaker’s intent was ambiguous, but
the Court did so on statutory grounds without reaching First Amendment issues. 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2004, 2007–12 (2015).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding a damages judgment and injunction against a
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could conceivably expand in application to cover more hateful invective if
such advocacy’s effects come to seem more immediate. As discussed below,
in the terrorism context the Supreme Court may have already opened a doctrinal pathway for an end run around Brandenburg altogether when risks of
violence appear grave enough.112
Again, how best to design the doctrine in these areas as a matter of first
principles is not my topic here. Nevertheless, the history highlighted earlier
should make clear that weakening existing near-absolute protection for expression of ideas could carry perils for minorities and dissidents of all stripes,
not just retrograde white supremacists. Unambiguous protection for bigoted
expression arose during a period when it served the evident corollary function of shielding civil rights advocates from bigoted government repression.
To the extent we are indeed undergoing a revival of prejudice—a period in
which perceived white grievances have gained new political traction, and officials of different parties may have quite distinct intuitions about what advocacy is most threatening and offensive—that protection may be more important than it has been as well.113
C. The Terrorism Problem
A last source of pressure for change could come from the ongoing threat of
ideological terrorism and political violence. As the September 11 attacks and
the many incidents here and abroad since then demonstrate, the United States
and other western democracies face a persistent terrorist threat from groups
and individuals motivated by radical jihadist beliefs. At the same time, newly
emboldened anti-government militias and domestic terrorist groups could pose
new threats to public safety as well,114 and recent incidents, including violence
at public demonstrations and a politically-motivated murderous assault on Republican members of Congress and their staff, raise fears that the rising tensions in our divided polity could yield a new season of political violence.115

112
113

114

115

pro-life website that listed abortion providers and crossed out the names of those who had been
murdered); id. at 1089–92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for ignoring the narrow
limits on the standard for true threats).
See infra Part III.C.
If this concern seems abstract, consider that a leaked recent FBI intelligence report identifies a
putative movement of “black identity extremists” as a significant threat to law enforcement. Jana
Winter & Sharon Weinberger, The FBI’s New U.S. Terrorist Threat: ‘Black Identity Extremists,’ FOREIGN
POL’Y (Oct. 6, 2017, 11:42 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/06/the-fbi-has-identified-anew-domestic-terrorist-threat-and-its-black-identity-extremists/.
See Jared A. Goldstein, To Kill and Die for the Constitution: Nullification and Insurrectionary Violence, in
NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 179, 209–10, 215–
20 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016) (discussing anti-government groups’ violent ideology and growing
strength).
See Peter Beinart, The Rise of the Violent Left, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2017, at 13–15 (describing the violent
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Terrorism and political violence, sadly, are also not new problems. What
makes them noteworthy here is that they are ideologically motivated. As a
result, restricting advocacy may appear to be a congenial solution to the
violence itself, particularly if attacks prove difficult or impossible to prevent.
Already, other western countries proscribe broader categories of incendiary
speech than our Supreme Court’s Brandenburg test allows.116 Even our Supreme
Court, moreover, recently opened up a possible pathway to upholding speechrestrictive anti-terrorism laws without confronting Brandenburg head on. In
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that a federal law could validly
prohibit providing “material support” (which the Court assumed could include
advice and expert assistance) to designated foreign terrorist groups, even for
non-terrorist purposes of the organization.117 The Court reached this result,
however, not by applying any First Amendment exception or even by
characterizing the regulated support as a form of “conduct,” but instead by
applying the “more demanding standard” applicable to laws that “regulate[ ]
speech on the basis of its content” and yet still deferring to Congress’s judgment
that the law was necessary to achieve compelling anti-terrorism purposes.118
As Eugene Volokh has argued, this type of strict-scrutiny end run around
the categorical exceptions is a potential Achilles’ heel to those categories’
narrow definitions.119 Preventing violent crime is a government purpose of
the highest order, and it is not always obvious that punishing such crimes or
their planning after the fact is a less restrictive means of preventing them than
is limiting their advocacy or encouragement.120 The Brandenburg test’s doctrinal function is thus not only to limit the domain of unprotected incitement,
but also to cut off arguments that restricting political advocacy outside the
test’s narrow bounds may be justified under strict scrutiny.121 Humanitarian
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117
118
119
120
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“Antifa” movement committed to countering right-wing protest activities); Peter Hermann, Amber
Phillips, Paul Kane & Rachel Weiner, Lawmaker Steve Scalise is Critically Injured in GOP Baseball Shooting;
Gunman James T. Hodgkinson is Killed by Police, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/multiple-people-injured-after-shooting-in-alexandria/2017/06/
14/0289c768-50f6-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term-=.6fcada4035ae (recounting
the shooting of Republican congressmen by “[a] man angry with President Trump”).
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Free Speech and the Incitement of Violence or Unlawful Behavior: Statutes Directed at
Speech, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL L AW 146, 156–61, 164–65 (Vikram David
Amar & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2009) (describing European and British law on incitement and
comparing it with that of the United States).
561 U.S. 1, 39–40 (2010).
Id. at 27–28, 35–36, 39–40 (quoting Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2417, 2441, 2444 (1996).
Id. at 2436.
Id. at 2445; cf. Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WISC. L.
REV. 115, 206 (characterizing Brandenburg’s “concrete definition of harm and imposition of causation requirements” as designed to “make[ ] evasion more difficult and force[ ] jurists to take a sober
second look at their thought processes before coming to a conclusion” (footnote omitted) (citing
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Law Project could prove significant if it has cracked open the door to this type
of defense for anti-terrorism legislation targeting speech or speech-related activities. Humanitarian Law Project, to be sure, was a peculiar case. Infused with
concerns about congressional foreign affairs powers that are normally absent
in domestic disputes, the decision need not be read broadly.122 But if terrorism fears find a political outlet in more repressive domestic counter-terrorism
legislation, the government is sure to push an expansive reading of Humanitarian Law Project in defending the statute.123
As with other topics addressed earlier, my main objective here is not to
take any firm view on the correct standard for unprotected incitement.124 As
a matter of first principles, balancing expressive freedom against imperatives
of personal and government security may be a hard problem, one that requires different standards in different societal contexts. As with fake news
and hate speech, however, weakening First Amendment protections in the
current partisan context could easily send us skidding down a quite slippery
slope. Overheated rhetoric is endemic to the filter-bubbles and echo-chambers of the internet. Sorting fits of pique from genuine threats is already a
challenge for law enforcement, one that could only be complicated by forcing
expression of extreme opinion deeper underground.125 At any rate, if we
open the door to punishing the advocacy itself without any tight standard of
immediacy such as Brandenburg’s, there may well be targets enough to go
around—and state and federal prosecutors with different political inclinations could find themselves competing to root out each side’s angriest elements.126 At the least, historical experience under the Supreme Court’s more
permissive pre-Brandenburg “clear and present danger” test suggests that even
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Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 47 (2003))).
See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 35 (emphasizing that “[i]n this litigation,” unlike domestic
free speech precedents, “Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make principled
distinctions between activities that will further terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign policy, and those that will not”). For a narrow interpretation and defense of the decision, see
Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 670–75, 697–707 (2017).
For a critique that advocates confining the case to its facts, see David Cole, The First Amendment’s
Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 147, 149–50 (2012).
See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for “fail[ing]
to examine the Government’s justifications with sufficient care”).
For a thoughtful recent discussion of restrictions on online terrorist advocacy that current case law
might allow, see Tsesis, supra note 122, at 664, 667, 670, 684, 692.
See, e.g., David Gray et. al, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 745, 788 (2013) (“Cyberharassment is a widespread and growing challenge for law
enforcement in the United States.”).
Again, as one illustration of the sorts of advocacy that some might seek to prosecute, consider the
FBI’s recent identification of “black identity extremists” as a significant public safety threat. See
Winter & Weinberger, supra note 113.
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fairly mild forms of anti-government protest could be targeted for repression
in an environment of public fear and military mobilization.127
D. Corrosive Political Dynamics and Doctrinal Downward Spirals
In each of these areas, then, societal pressure for greater speech restriction
could conceivably find a doctrinal outlet, yet in each case doing so could conceivably backfire on some groups most inclined at present to advocate it.
However worthy the goal, if we begin attempting to cleanse public debate of
falsity, hatred, and illiberalism, there will be defendants enough to go around,
and the targets of repression might often turn as much on the political affinities of the prosecutor as on the real dangerousness of the speech in question.
A last concern to consider, moreover, is that doctrinal evolution along
any of these fronts could increase pressure for movement along the others as
well. Though there is room for partisan application within each category,
the topics I highlighted have rough political valences, at least in the immediate political context. As a rough generalization, fake news and media fragmentation is at present a predominantly liberal concern, and regulating hate
speech likewise appeals mostly to progressive groups; on the other hand, although terrorism is certainly a bipartisan fear, conservatives at present appear
most likely to advocate harsh additional legal measures, at least with respect
to jihadist groups.128 This context could magnify the dynamics already
noted. Eugene Volokh has noted the psychological phenomenon of “censorship envy”: repression of speech others fear can promote arguments that, out
of fairness, speech one fears oneself should likewise be repressed.129 As a
political matter, that seems likely in the contexts addressed here: regulating
left-wing radicalism would make it harder to justify tolerating right-wing radicalism (and vice versa).
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See, e.g., STONE, supra note 43, at 208–11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s speech-restrictive understanding of the test during the World War I period); see also id. at 13 (noting a general historical
pattern of going “too far in sacrificing civil liberties—especially the freedom of speech”—during
periods of national-security emergency); Wells, supra note 121, at 119 (offering a case study of anticommunist prosecutions to “explore[ ] the psychological influences that may lead judges to succumb to fear and prejudice in times of crisis and, consequently, to abdicate their judicial role”).
See, e.g., David M. Jackson, Trump Advocates Waterboarding and ‘Much Worse’ to Battle Terrorists, USA
TODAY (June 29, 2016) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/
06/29/donald-trump-istanbul-airport-attack-hillary-clinton/86504460/ (reporting “aggressive
rhetoric” by then-candidate Donald Trump).
Eugene Volokh, Censorship Envy, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/16/censorship-envy/
?ut-m_term=.8281d4d2248c; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1026, 1059–61 (2003) (describing “censorship envy,” which is what happens “when a free
speech exception is created for one constituency” as opposed to another, and those “others may
resent even more the absence of an exception for their own favored cause”).
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Judges and justices should be less susceptible to this type of response than
others. But the judiciary is sharply divided as well, and judges and justices
from different parties may well share some differences in perception of relative
dangerousness reflected in public opinion at large. As a result, self-reinforcing
downward spirals could be possible in doctrinal evolution as well, possibly
even without judges being aware of them. At the least, we have been through
periods of constitutional retrogression before, most notably during the slow
judicial abandonment of racial equality at the close of Reconstruction.130
Ever since it took hold several decades ago, our First Amendment absolutism has been largely self-reinforcing: it has promoted cases and arguments
that further expand the First Amendment’s coverage, building out an evermore elaborate structure of expressive protections.131 But the same sort of
process could also work in reverse. Acute current problems, such as those I
have highlighted here, could yield a set of cases and arguments in which familiar First Amendment platitudes stick in the throat. But if precedent moves
in a less protective direction, and if we do not think carefully in advance
about future lines of argument and principled responses to them, we might
find several decades hence that not only the structure’s outer emanations, but
also the First Amendment bedrock itself is chipped and cracked in ways we
scarcely anticipated when the process began.
CONCLUSION
Whatever its merits as a matter of first principles, our country’s distinctive
approach to expressive freedom has been a point of broad judicial consensus.
In all likelihood, it will remain so. But in this fevered political season, it seems
worth giving thought to the historical circumstances that generated this consensus and how current circumstances might cause it to erode.
As I have tried to sketch briefly here, current doctrine reflects a particular
emphasis on neutrality between ideas that took hold during a period when
civil rights protesters and other progressive groups were obvious prime beneficiaries of this understanding. Ever since, this absolutist approach has guaranteed freedom for radicals and dissidents of all stripes to express even dangerous and despicable ideas—and in doing so the doctrine has anchored an
unambiguous protection for the rest of us to express our own views without
fear of government repression. A central question today is how, if at all, this
understanding should adapt to the new challenges of our time, including the
three I have highlighted here: (1) new communications technologies and their
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For recent analysis of this history, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 184–205 (2011); 2 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 426–31, 491, 493–94 (2016).
Schauer, supra note 72, at 1625–28.
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power to propagate falsity as well as truth; (2) apparent reinvigoration of bigoted and hateful groups and ideas; and (3) ongoing threats of ideologically
motivated terrorism and political violence.
These are all hard problems that will require thoughtful responses by
courts, governments, and citizens in the years ahead. In this brief Article, I
have tried only to highlight how the current partisan context may make certain speech-repressive solutions to these problems both more appealing than
they have been in the past, but also potentially more perilous. In a sharply
divided polity with deep differences over what speech is most threatening or
offensive, any new equilibrium is unlikely to favor one side or the other unambiguously. Instead, weakening the current expansive approach will open
doors for repressive forces on both sides to hunt their own preferred quarry.
We appear to be on a downward spiral in other areas of our political life.
We should take care to avoid one here. In this season of dissent and distrust,
the right to advocate any idea, however offensive, distasteful, or dangerous,
remains an important underpinning of democratic self-government. It is a
heritage we abandon at our peril.

